Bill has worked in education as an English and history teacher, an administrator, and a technology director. Bill initially discovered the Internet in the mid-1990's at the insistence of a student who wouldn't stop talking about it.

twitter.com/funnymonkey

github.com/billfitzgerald

drupal.org/user/19631

Privacy Postcard: Starbucks Mobile App

2 min read

For more information about Privacy Postcards, read this post.

General Information

App permissions

The Starbucks app has permissions to read your contacts, and to get network location and location from GPS.

Starbucks app permissions

Access contacts

The application permissions indicate that the app can access contacts, and this is reinforced in the privacy policy.

600

Law enforcement

Starbucks terms specify that they will share data if sharing the information is required by law, or if sharing information helps protect Starbuck's rights.

Starbucks law enforcement

Location information and Device IDs

Starbucks can use location as part of a broader user profile.

Starbucks collects location info

Data Combined from External Sources

The terms specify that Starbucks can collect, store, and use information about you from multiple sources, including other companies.

Starbucks data collection

Third Party Collection

The terms state that Starbucks can allow third parties to collect device and location information.

Third party

Social Sharing or Login

The terms state that Starbucks facilitates tracking across multiple services.

Social sharing

Summary of Risk

The Starbucks mobile app has several problematic areas. Individually, they would all be grounds for concern. Collectively, they show a clear lack of regard for the privacy of people who use the Starbucks app. The fact that the service harvests contacts, and harvests location information, and allows selected information to be used by third parties to profile people creates significant privacy risk.

People shouldn't have to sell out their contact list and share their physical location to get a cup of coffee. I love coffee as much as the next person, but avoid the app (and maybe go to a local coffee shop), pay cash, and tip the barista well.

Privacy Postcards, or Poison Pill Privacy

10 min read

NOTE: While this is obvious to most people, I am restating this here for additional emphasis: this is my personal blog, and only represents my personal opinions. In this space, I am only writing for myself. END NOTE.

I am going to begin this post with a shocking, outrageous, hyperbolic statement: privacy policies are difficult to read.

Shocking. I know. Take a moment to pull yourself up from the fainting couch. Even Facebook doesn't read all the necessary terms. Policies are dense, difficult to parse, and in many cases appear to be overwhelming by design.

When evaluating a piece of technology, "regular" people want an answer to one simple question: how will this app or service impact my privacy?

It's a reasonable question, and this process is designed to make it easier to get an answer to that question. When we evaluate the potential privacy risks of a service, good practice can often be undone by a single bad practice, so the art of assessing risk is often the art of searching for the poison pill.

To highight that this process is both not comprehensive and focused on surfacing risks, I'm calling this process Privacy Postcards, or Poison Pill Privacy - it is not designed to be comprehensive, at all. Instead, it is designed to highlight potential problem areas that impact privacy. It's also designed to be straightforward enough that anyone can do this. Various privacy concerns are broken down, and include keywords that can be used to find relevant text in the policies.

To see an example of what this looks like in action, check out this example. The rest of this post explains the rationale behind the process.

If anyone reading this works in K12 education and you want to use this with students as part of media literacy, please let me know. I'd love to support this process, or just hear how it went and how the process could be improved

1. The Process

Application/Service

Collect some general information about the service under evaluation.

  • Name of Service:
  • Android App
  • Privacy Policy url:
  • Policy Effective Date:

App permissions

Pull a screenshot of selected app permissions from the Google Play store. The iOS store from Apple does not support the transparency that is implemented in the Google Play store. If the service being evaluated does not have a mobile app, or only has an iOS version, skip this step.

The listing of app permissions is useful because it highlights some of the information that the service collects. The listing of app permissions is not a complete list of what the service collects, nor does it provide insight into how the information is used, shared, or sold. However, the breakdown of app permissions is a good tool to use to get a snapshot of how well or poorly the service limits data collection to just what is needed to deliver the service.

Access contacts

Accessing contacts from a phone or address book is one way that we can compromise our own privacy, and the privacy of our friends, family, and colleagues. This can be especially true for people who work in jobs where they have access to sensitive information or priviliged information. For example, if a therapist had contact information of patients stored in their phone and that information was harvested by an app, that could potentially compromise the privacy of the therapist's clients.

When looking at if or how contacts are accessed, it's useful to cross-reference what the app permissions tell us against what the privacy policy tells us. For example, if the app permissions state that the app can access contacts and the privacy policy says nothing about how contacts are protected, that's a sign that the privacy policy could have areas that are incomplete and/or inadequate.

Keywords: contact, friend, list, access

Law enforcement

Virtually every service in the US needs to comply with law enforcement requests, should they come in. However, the languaga that a service uses about how they comply with law enforcement requests can tell us a lot about how a service's posture around protecting user privacy.

Additionally, is a service has no language in their terms about how they respond to law enforcement or other legal requests, that can be an indicator that the terms have other areas where the terms are incomplete and/or inadequate.

Keywords: legal, law enforcement, comply

Location information and Device IDs

As individual data elements, both a physical location and a device ID are sensitive pieces of information. It's also worth noting that there are multiple ways to get location information, and different ways of identifying an individual device. The easiest way to get precise location information is via the GPS functionality in mobile devices. However, IP addresses can also be mapped to specific locations, and a string of IP addresses (ie, what someone would get if they connected to a wireless network at their house, a local coffee shop, and a library) can give a sense of someone's movement over time.

Device IDs are unique identifiers, and every phone or tablet has multiple IDs that are unique to the device. Additionally, browser fingerprinting can be used on its own or alongside other IDs to precisely identify an individual.

The combination of a device ID and location provides the grail for data brokers and other trackers, such as advertisers: the ability to tie online and offline behavior to a specific identity. Once a data broker knows that a person with a specific device goes to a set of specific locations, they can use that information to refine what they know about a person. In this way, data collectors build and maintain profiles over time.

Keywords: location, zip, postal, identifier, browser, device, ID, street, address

Data Combined from External Sources

As noted above, if a data broker can use a device ID and location information to tie a person to a location, they can then combine information from external sources to create a more thorough profile about a person, and that person's colleagues, friends, and families.

We can see examples of data recombination in how Experian sorts humans into classes: data recombination helps them identify and distinguish their "Picture Perfect Families" from the "Stock cars and State Parks" and the "Urban Survivors" and the "Small Towns Shallow Pockets".

And yes, the company combining this data and making these classifications is the same company that sold data to an identity thief and was responsible for a breach affecting 15 million people. Data recombination matters, and device identifiers within data sets allow companies to connect disparate data sources into a larger, more coherent profile.

Keywords: combine, enhance, augment, source

Third Party Collection

If a service allows third parties to collect data from users of the service, that creates an opportunity for each of these third parties to get information about people in the ways that we have described above. Third parties can access a range of information (such as device IDs, browser fingerprints, and browsing histories) about users on a service, and frequently, there is no practical way for people using a service to know what third parties are collecting information, or how these third parties will use it.

Additionally, third parties can also combine data from multiple sources.

Keywords: third, third party, external, partner, affiliate

Social Sharing or Login

Social Sharing or Login, when viewed through a privacy lens, should be seen as a specialized form of third party data collection. With social login, however, information about a person can be exchanged between the two services, or taken from one service.

Social login and social sharing features (like the Facebook "like" button, a "Pin it" link, or a "Share on Twitter" link) can send tracking information back to the home sites, even if the share never happens. Solutions like this option from Heise highlight how this privacy issue can be addressed.

Keywords: login, external, social, share, sharing

Education-specific Language

This category only makes sense on services that are used in educational contexts. For services that are only used in a consumer context, this section might be superfluous.

As noted below, I'm including COPPA in the list of keywords here even though COPPA is a consumer law. Because COPPA (in the US) is focused on children under 13, there are times when COPPA connects with educational settings.

Keywords: parent, teacher, student, school, , family, education, FERPA, child, COPPA

Other

Because this list of concerns is incomplete, and there are other problematic areas, we need a place to highlight these concerns if and when they come up. When I use this structure, I will use this section to highlight interesting elements within the terms that don't fit into the other sections.

If, however, there are elements in the other sections that are especially problematic, I probably won't spend the time on this section.

Summary of Risk

This section is used to summarize the types of privacy risks associated with the service. As with this entire process, the goal here is not to be comprehensive. Rather, this section highlights potential risk, and whether those risks are in line with what a service does. IE, if a service collects location information, how is that information both protected from unwarranted use by third parties and used to benefit the user?

2. Closing Notes

At the risk of repeating myself unnecessarily, this process is not intended to be comprehensive.

The only goal here is to streamline the process of identify and describing poison pills buried in privacy policies. This method of evaluation is not thorough. It will not capture every detail. It will even miss problems. But, it will catch a lot of things as well. In a world where nothing is perfect, this process will hopefully prove useful.

The categories listed here all define different ways that data can be collected and used. One of the categories explicitly left out of the Privacy Postcard is data deletion. This is not an oversight; this is an intentional choice. Deletion is not well understood, and actual deletion is easier to do in theory than in practice. This is a longer conversation, but the main reason that I am leaving deletion out of the categories I include here is that data deletion generally doesn't touch any data collected by third party adtech allowed on a service. Because of this, assurances about data deletion can often create more confusion. The remedy to this, of course, is for a service to not use any third party adtech, and to have strict contractual requirements with any third party services (like analytics providers) that restrict data use. Many educational software providers already do this, and it would be great to see this adopted more broadly within the tech industry at large.

The ongoing voyage of MySpace data - sold to an adtech company in 2011, re-sold in 2016, and breached in 2016 - highlights that data that is collected and not deleted can have a long shelf life, completely outside the context in which it was originally collected.

For those who want to use this structure to create your own Privacy Postcards, I have created a skeleton structure on Github. Please, feel free to clone this, copy it, modify it, and make it your own.

Dark Patterns when Deleting an Account on Facebook

3 min read

By default, Facebook makes it more complicated than it needs to be to delete an account. Their default state is to have an account be deactivated, but not deleted.

However, both the deactivation and deletion process can be undone if a person logs back into Facebook.

To make matters worse, to fully delete an account, a person needs to make a separate request to Facebook to start the account deletion process. Facebook splits the important information across two separate pages, which further complicates the process of actually deleting an account. The main page for deleting an account has some pretty straightforward language.

However, this language is undercut by the information on the . page that describes the difference between deactivating and deleting an account.

Some key details from the second page that are omitted from the main page on deleting an account include this gem:

We delay deletion a few days after it's requested. A deletion request is cancelled if you log back into your Facebook account during this time.

This delay is critical, and the fact that it can be undone is also something that needs additional attention.

Facebook further clarifies what they consider "logging in" in a third, separate page, where they describe deactivating an account.

If you’d like to come back to Facebook after you’ve deactivated your account, you can reactivate your account at anytime by logging in with your email and password. Keep in mind, if you use your Facebook account to log into Facebook or somewhere else, your account will be reactivated.

While Facebook's instructions aren't remotely as clear as they should be, the language they use here implies that an account deletion request can be undone if a person logs in (or possibly just uses a service with an active Facebook login) at any point during the "few days" after a person has requested their account deletion. It's also unclear what this means if someone logs into Messenger. And, of course, the avcerage person will never know that their Facebook account hasn't been deleted because they won't be going back to Facebook to check.

My recommendations here for people looking to leave Facebook:

  • First, identify any third party services where you use Facebook login. If possible, migrate those accounts to a separate login unconnected from Facebook.
  • Second, delete the Facebook app from all mobile devices.
  • Third, using the web UI on a computer, request account deletion from within Facebook.
  • Fourth, install an ad blocker so Facebook has a harder time tracking you via social share icons.

Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, Privacy, and Informed Consent

4 min read

There has been a significant amount of coverage and commentary on the new revelations about Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, and how Facebook's default settings were exploited to allow personal information about 50 million people to be exfiltrated from Facebook.

There are a lot of details to this story - if I ever have the time (unlikely), I'd love to write about many of them in more detail. I discussed a few of them in this thread over on Twitter. But as we digest this story, we need to move past the focus on the Trump campaign and Brexit. This story has implications for privacy and our political systems moving forward, and we need to understand them in this broader context.

But for this post, I want to focus on two things that are easy to overlook in this story: informed consent, and how small design decisions that don't respect user privacy allow large numbers of people -- and the systems we rely on -- to be exploited en masse.

The following quote is from a NY Times article - the added emphasis is mine:

Dr. Kogan built his own app and in June 2014 began harvesting data for Cambridge Analytica. The business covered the costs — more than $800,000 — and allowed him to keep a copy for his own research, according to company emails and financial records.

All he divulged to Facebook, and to users in fine print, was that he was collecting information for academic purposes, the social network said. It did not verify his claim. Dr. Kogan declined to provide details of what happened, citing nondisclosure agreements with Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, though he maintained that his program was “a very standard vanilla Facebook app.”

He ultimately provided over 50 million raw profiles to the firm, Mr. Wylie said, a number confirmed by a company email and a former colleague. Of those, roughly 30 million — a number previously reported by The Intercept — contained enough information, including places of residence, that the company could match users to other records and build psychographic profiles. Only about 270,000 users — those who participated in the survey — had consented to having their data harvested.

The first highlighted quotation gets at what passes for informed consent. However, in this case, for people to make informed consent, they had to understand two things, neither of which are obvious or accessible: first, they had to read the terms of service for the app and understand how their information could be used and shared. But second -- and more importantly -- the people who took the quiz needed to understand that by taking the quiz, they were also sharing personal information of all their "friends" on Facebook, as permitted and described in Facebook's terms. This was a clearly documented feature available to app developers that wasn't modified until 2015. I wrote about this privacy flaw in 2009 (as did many other people over the years). But, this was definitely insider knowledge, and the expectation that a person getting paid three dollars to take an online quiz (for the Cambridge Analytica research) would read two sets of dense legalese as part of informed consent is unrealistic.

As reported in the NYT and quoted above, only 270,000 people took the quiz for Cambridge Analytica - yet these 270,000 people exposed 50,000,000 people via their "friends" settings. This is what happens when we fail to design for privacy protections. To state this another way, this is what happens when we design systems to support harvesting information for companies, as opposed to protecting information for users.

Facebook worked as designed here, and this design allowed the uninformed decisions of 270,000 people to create a dataset that potentially undermined our democracy.

Spectre, Meltdown, Adtech, Malware, and Encryption

2 min read

This week has seen a lot of attention paid to Spectre and Meltdown, and justifiably so. Get the technical details here: https://spectreattack.com/

These issues are potentially catastrophic for cloud providers (see the details in the articles linked above) but they can also affect regular users on the web. While there are updates available for browsers that mitigate the attack, and updates available for most major operating systems, updates only work when they are applied, which means that we will almost certainly see vulnerable systems into the foreseeable future.

I was very happy to see both Nicholas Weaver and Zeynep Tufekci addressing the connection between these vulnerabilities and adtech. 

Adtech leaves all internet users exposed to malware - it has for a while, and, in its current form, adtech exposes us to unneeded risk (as well as compromising our privacy). This risk is increased because many commonly used adtech providers do not support or require encryption.

To examine traffic over the web, use an open source tool like OWASP ZAP. If you are running a Linux machine, routing traffic through your computer and OWASP ZAP is pretty straightforward if you set your computer up to act as an access point

But, using these basic tools, it's simple to see how widespread the issue of unencrypted adtech actually is, in both web sites and mobile applications (on a related note, some mobile apps actually get their content via an unencrypted zip file. You read that correctly - the expected payload is an unencrypted zip file. That's a topic for a different post, and I'm not naming names, but the fact that this is accepted behavior within app stores in 2018 should raise some serious questions).

The unencrypted adtech includes javascript sent to the browser or the device. Because this javascript is sent unencrypted over the network, intercepting it and modifying it would be pretty straightforward, which exposes people to increased risk. 

The next time you are in a coffee shop and see a kid playing a game on their parent's device while the parent talks with a friend, ask yourself: is that kid playing an online game, or downloading malware, or both? Because so much adtech is sent unencrypted, anything is possible.

AdTech, the New York Times, and Normalizing Fascism

4 min read

Today, the New York Times published a piece that normalized and humanized Nazis. I'm not linking to it; feel free to find it on your own, but I'm not giving it any additional traffic.

As was noted on Twitter, Hitler also received flattering press. 

However, because the NYT puts ads on its online content, they make money even when they put out dangerously irresponsible journalism. Due to the perversities of human nature, they probably make more money on the dangerously irresponsible pieces.

But, so does the adtech industry that the NYT uses to target ads. The adtech industry collects and combines information from everyone who visits this page. They aren't as visible as the NY Times, because they operate in the background, but adtech companies are happy to profit while the rest of us suffer. 

Here are some of the companies that had ads placed alongside a disgusting story that normalizes Nazis, fascism, racism, and everything that is wrong with how we are currently failing to address hate in our country. To state what should be obvious, none of these brands chose to advertise on this specific story. However, their presence alongside this story gives an explicit stamp of approval to prose that normalizes fascism. We'll return to this at the end of the piece.

Citi wants us all to know that, provided you use a Citi card, they are okay with Nazis.

Fascist literature and firepits

You know what goes great with fascist literature? A firepit from ultimatepatio.com

sig heil and grills

If your ex-band mate whitewashes fascism as being "proud of their heritage" why not invite them over for a cookout? BBQGuys.com thinks grilling with Nazis is great.

Hitler and Mussolini and toys

Better make room for some gifts from Fat Brain Toys alsongside your Hitler and Mussolini literature.

T-Mobile, your network for Nazis

And if you're calling your Nazi friends, T Mobile wants you to do it on their network.

Nazis and firepits

And, Starfire Direct wants that special Nazi to Reignite Your Life.

As I said earlier, none of these companies chose to advertise on this page. But, because of the lazy mechanism that is modern adtech, "mistakes" like this happen all the time. These "mistakes" rely on an industry that operates in the shadows, makes vague promises to do better, and is predicated on constant monitoring of the web sites we visit, the places we shop (including using facial recognition), and connecting online and offline behavior. Despite industry promises of how this near-constant tracking doesn't impact our privacy, a recent study highlighted that, using AdTech as it was designed, it takes about $1,000 US to identify an individual using mobile ads.

But returning to the NY Times piece that normalizes fascism in the United States and the advertising technology used by the NY Times and just about every other publisher out there: sloppy journalism and lazy advertising both take shortcuts that we can't afford.

Modern adtech is appealing because, for brands, it offers ease of access alongside the promise of precisely targeting users. Sloppy journalism is "appealing" because it looks suspiciously like the real thing, and -- due to how adtech works -- it can ring up revenue in the short term.

But, given where we are, we need to stop looking for shortcuts. Doing things well feels like more work as we get started, but we are currently experiencing what happens in our information and political systems when we take shortcuts.

End Note: The article had tracking calls from over 50 different adtech companies, which is actually on the average to low side of other mainstream news sites. The adtech companies used by NY Times include most of the usual suspects, including Facebook, Google/Doubleclick, LinkedIn, Moat, Twitter, Amazon, AppNexus, Media.net, Bluekai, and AddThis.

Misinformation Equilibrium

2 min read

Given the state of political discourse (or what passes for political discourse) in the US, and the resounding and ongoing success of misinformation spread via online media, the people spreading misinformation have a decided advantage.

What I've been seeing (although this is anecdotal and based solely on non-scientific observation, so take it with a grain of salt): whenever there is a topic that is remotely controversial, bots and trolls get active in amplifying the extreme positions. They don't need to make a point, or even to have a specific position "win." All they need to do is stoke distrust, which in turn makes it more difficult for actual inhabitants of these United States to talk with one another.

Because we are primed to mistrust based, we make the work of people spreading misinformation that much easier.

So, my question: what are the concrete steps we need to take to repair trust?

(and when I say "repair trust" I'm not saying accept hatred, racism, neo-fascists, or anything like that. Denying the humanity of people is a hard red line that has no place, and deserves no quarter. But for the rest of us - how do we set aside mistrust and find something that looks like common ground? How do we avoid getting derailed by the forces that thrive on our divisions?)

Media Literacy When the Platforms Are Complicit

3 min read

In June of 2016, Twitter tried to upsell RT -- a propaganda arm of the Russin government -- to increase RT's visibility on Twitter during the US elections. The image below is included in the full article on Buzzfeed:

Email from Twitter Sales to RT

As you can see from the email, Twitter's offer to a propaganda arm of a foreign government included an elections specialist, and early access to new features.

Let's just pause here: a US tech company was willing to provide consulting support to a propaganda arm controlled by a foreign government advertising in our elections for a million dollars.

This is how our democracy is sold. And given the amount of money spent on both politics and tech, the price isn't even very high. RT appeared not to take Twitter up on their offer, probably because it's cheaper to staff convincing troll accounts to manipulate Twitter users, thanks in large part to Twitter's pathetic efforts at addressing bots and trolls on their site.

And, of course, Twitter is far from alone in pursuing advertising revenue from questionable sources. Facebook and Google eagerly accepted money from and provided consulting support to racist campaigns. This is how data collection in the pursuit of targeted advertising works. They will collect data on as many people as possible, and sell to anyone who can pay. The process of online advertising is so opaque and technical that it allows companies to evade scrutiny.

Here is my question to adults working with K12 and college students on information literacy: how do you make students aware that corporate social media platforms and search engines are part of the structure that makes misinformation thrive?

How do we reconcile that when we use Google to search for verification of a story, we are providing Google with data about us that can, in turn, be used to serve us misinformation -- and that if the client pays enough, Google will provide a consultant to help the misinformation merchants do it better?

How do we work with students (and let's be honest here - other adults) to deconstruct that when Facebook or Twitter or other services "recommend" something to us, the recommendation is getting filtered through who has paid to access our attention?

As adults who care about helping people understand our information environment, what steps do we take to ask meaningful questions about the information we read, and believe, and share?

A lot of conversations about media literacy focus on the need to teach youth the skills to disentangle truth -- or a reliable version -- from misinformation. While this is important, this is incomplete. Misinformation is an over-18 problem. In the US, the vast majority of students in K12 didn't vote in the 2016 election. Adults need this training as much as -- if not more than -- kids. We can't teach this well without a rudimentary understanding of the subject.

So: how are we teaching ourselves, and our peers, to do better?

What does it mean to do informal professional development, in the form of Twitter chats, on a platform that actively tried to sell our attention to a foreign government?

More importantly, how do we reconcile or explain this conflict?

I don't have solid or satisfying answers to any of these questions, but the answers start with acknowledging the depth of the problem, and the shallowness of our understanding.

Daily Post, October 24, 2017

5 min read

It's been a busy few days, but here are some of the things I've been reading. Enjoy!

Open Source Code from ProPublica to Detect Political Ads

While the lawyers at major tech companies complain that it's too hard to find political ads, ProPublica released code showing how easy it is to identify political ads..

We're asking our readers to use this extension when they are browsing Facebook. While they are on Facebook a background script runs to collect ads they see. The extension shows those ads to users and asks them to decide whether or not a particular ad is political. Serverside, we use those ratings to train a naive bayes classifier that then automatically rates the other ads we've collected. The extension also asks the server for the most recent ads that the classifier thinks are political so that users can see political ads they haven't seen. We're careful to protect our user's privacy by not sending identifying information to our backend server.

Adtech won't fix this problem. They have a financial interest in not fixing this problem. Every day that passes without a fix for this problem is another day they make money from undermining our democracy. I also doubt the ability of our current crop of lawmakers to understand the problem, or understand a good solution.

BlockBear

Blockbear is an ad blocker for iOS, made by the same folks that make TunnelBear VPN.

A really simple, often adorable adblocker for your iPhone or iPad.

  • Blocks ads and invasive online tracking
  • Load many websites 3-5 times faster
  • Whitelist your favorite websites
  • Has bears

You could download another adblocker, but then you wouldn't have a bear!

While I haven't used this, it looks interesting.

Obfuscation Workshop Report

The report from the Inernational Workshop on Obfuscation is now released and available for download.

We have asked our panelists to each provide a brief essay summarizing their project, concept, application—with an emphasis on the questions, challenges, and discussions raised during the weekend. As with the workshop itself, this report is a starting point rather than an end point.

I haven't read this yet, so have little to say on the contents, but obfuscation is one of many tools we have to protect our privacy, and make the data collected about us less useful.

China's "Social Credit" System

China is rolling out a system that publicly measures every citizen. Thought experiment: how much more data would a country need besides what Facebook or Google already collect to create a similar system?

Imagine a world where many of your daily activities were constantly monitored and evaluated: what you buy at the shops and online; where you are at any given time; who your friends are and how you interact with them; how many hours you spend watching content or playing video games; and what bills and taxes you pay (or not). It's not hard to picture, because most of that already happens, thanks to all those data-collecting behemoths like Google, Facebook and Instagram or health-tracking apps such as Fitbit. But now imagine a system where all these behaviours are rated as either positive or negative and distilled into a single number, according to rules set by the government. That would create your Citizen Score and it would tell everyone whether or not you were trustworthy. Plus, your rating would be publicly ranked against that of the entire population and used to determine your eligibility for a mortgage or a job, where your children can go to school - or even just your chances of getting a date.

This is what data does, very well. Data supports systems that rate, rank, sort, all day long. This is not a neutral activity. Anyone who claims otherwise is not adequately informed.

Can We All Just Encrypt Our Stuff Already?

Troy Hunt lays out a clear roadmap for implementing encryption on a web site.

Well, it can be more difficult but it can also be fundamentally simple. In this post I want to detail the 6-step "Happy Path", that is the fastest, easiest way you can get HTTPS up and running right.

This change is coming, so please, just do this. Now. Please.

For $1000 You Can Track Someone Via Adtech

The research in this paper shows how the core features of an ad network can be used to track an individual.

There is a fundamental tension at work in the online advertising ecosystem: the precision targeting features we used for these attacks have been developed for legitimate business purposes. Advertisers are incentivized to provide more highly targeted ads, but each increase in targeting precision inherently increases ADINT capabilities.

This is how data tracking works. Data allows us to ask questions. The researchers in this study didn't exploit a bug. They used the advertising systems exactly as they were designed. This technicque would almost certainly work to target children.

Facebook Tests Gouging Publishers

Facebook can spin this effort to gouge publishers in a few ways, but their move to pull all non-sponsored posts from user's feeds would force publishers to pay Facebook in order to reach people.

A new system being trialled in six countries including Slovakia, Serbia and Sri Lanka sees almost all non-promoted posts shifted over to a secondary feed, leaving the main feed focused entirely on original content from friends, and adverts.

Facebook might even try and spin this as an effort to combat misinformation, but this move really demonstrates what the "meritocracy" looks like in Silicon Valley: if you want access, pay the people who control it. For any publishers who had any illusions about how Facebook views them, this move should dispel all doubts. It's also worth noting where Facebook rolled this test out: smaller countries with, presumably, a userbase with fewer connections.

Daily Post - October 18, 2017

4 min read

Some of the articles and news that crossed my desk on )ctober 18, 2017. Enjoy!

Facebook and Google Worked with Racist Campaigns, at Home and Abroad

Both Facebook and Google worked closely with an ad agency running blatantly racist ads during the 2016 campaign. Both companies worked on targeting more precisely, and provided a range of technical support.

Facebook advertising salespeople, creative advisers and technical experts competed with sales staff from Alphabet Inc.’s Google for millions in ad dollars from Secure America Now, the conservative, nonprofit advocacy group whose campaign included a mix of anti-Hillary Clinton and anti-Islam messages, the people said.

Facebook also worked with at least one campaign putting racist ads in Germany to target German voters. This is what the "neutrality" of tech looks like: racism with money behind it is always welcome. The data collection and subsequent profiling of people is a central element of how racism is spread, and how data brokers and advertising companies work together to profit.

Russia Recruited Activists to Stage Protests

The people who were recruited didn't know they were working with Russians. But this is an odd corner of Russian attempts to create noise and conflict around issues related to race.

Russia’s most infamous troll farm recruited US activists to help stage protests and organize self-defense classes in black communities as part of an effort to sow divisions in US society ahead of the 2016 election and well into 2017.

As always, research your funders and contacts.

US Government Wants the Right to Access Any Data Stored Anywhere

The US Supreme Court will hear a case that looks at whether a legal court order can compel a company to hand over information, even if that information is stored outside the US.

In its appeal to the high court, meanwhile, the US government said that the US tech sector should turn over any information requested with a valid court warrant. It doesn't matter where the data is hosted, the government argues. What matters, the authorities maintain, is whether the data can be accessed from within the United States.

This has the potential to open the floodgates for personal data to be accessed regardless of where it is stored. This would also gut privacy laws outside the US (or create a legal mess that will take years to untangle, and make lawyers very rich). It will also kills the tech economy and isolate the US, because who outside the US would want to connect to a mess like that?

For $1000 US, You Can Use AdTech to Track and Identify an Individual

A research team spent $1000 with an ad network, and used that to track an individual's location via targeted ads.

An advertising-savvy spy, they've shown, can spend just a grand to track a target's location with disturbing precision, learn details about them like their demographics and what apps they have installed on their phone, or correlate that information to make even more sensitive discoveries—say, that a certain twentysomething man has a gay dating app installed on his phone and lives at a certain address, that someone sitting next to the spy at a Starbucks took a certain route after leaving the coffee shop, or that a spy's spouse has visited a particular friend's home or business.

The researches didn't exploit any bugs in mobile ad networks. They used them as designed. So, aspiring stalkers, abusers, blackmailers, home invaders, or nosy creeps: rest easy. If you have $1000 US, AdTech has your back.

Watches Designed for Helicopter Parents Have Multiple Security and Privacy Issues. Cue Surprise

In what should surprise absolutely no one, it looks like spyware designed for the hypervigilant and short-sighted parent have multiple security flaws that expose kids to focused risk.

Together with the security firm Mnemonic, the Norwegian Consumer Council tested several smartwatches for children. Our findings are alarming. We discovered significant security flaws, unreliable safety features and a lack of consumer protection.

Surveillance isn't caring. I completely understand that raising a kid can be petrifying, but when we substitute technology for communication, we create both unintended consequences and multiple other points of potential failure.